================================================================================ 04: LINUX MINT HARDENING: SOLUTION WALKTHROUGH Linux Mint 22.3 (Cinnamon), Ubuntu 24.04 base Training reference for virtual machines you own or are authorized to change. Three levels: L1 Doorman, L2 Watchman, L3 Hunter. Every item = COMMAND, WHY, NOTE, and the hardening AREA it belongs to; ALSO adds a second caution when an item needs one. No scripts by design: type it, read it, explain it. Item IDs match the Lockdown Drills trainer for this OS. Unofficial practice; not affiliated with or endorsed by Linux Mint or Canonical. HARDENING AREAS (CIS Critical Security Controls v8.1) Account management ........ CIS Control 5 Access control ............ CIS Control 6 Secure configuration ...... CIS Control 4 (software inventory: Control 2) Patching .................. CIS Control 7 Malware defenses .......... CIS Control 10 Audit logging ............. CIS Control 8 Also tagged: Data protection (CIS Control 3); Investigation (forensics basics: answer questions and preserve evidence before you change things). ================================================================================ ------------------------------ DOORMAN ----------------------------------------- Lock the doors. Users, admins, passwords, lockout, firewall, updates, junk software, obvious services, the Login Window. Mint is Ubuntu LTS underneath (see Version notes), with its own GUI tools on top. Learn it first: Defense Ladder s3, Debian-family hardening. https://freeapp4that.store/defense-ladder/#sophomore/s3 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- [B-00] Scenario brief and evidence first AREA: Investigation (forensics basics) GUI: open the scenario brief (the documented requirements for this machine) and write down authorized users, admins, required services, and anything forbidden $ sudo timeshift --create --comments "before hardening" (practice VMs) $ mkdir -p ~/audit/day1 && cd ~/audit/day1 && touch changes.txt && pwd (one folder for evidence and backups; log each change with what, why, and how to undo it) $ sudo cp -a /etc/login.defs /etc/login.defs.bak (copy each file before you edit it; -a keeps the owner, mode, and time) $ sudo rsync -a /home/ /mnt/backup/home/ (copies the home folders to a mounted backup drive; a backup counts once a test restore works) $ man login.defs (the manual for a command or a config file; / searches, n finds the next match, q quits) WHY: Authorized users, admins, and required services decide what is a fix and what breaks the business. Evidence first: answer the investigation questions before any change (Defense Ladder f1). NOTE: Unfamiliar differs from unauthorized: trace and ask before removing agents (Defense Ladder s1). PAM, sudoers, or SSH typos lock you out: keep a root terminal (sudo -i) open. ALSO: Snapshot practice VMs first (Mint's free undo). Start B-08's upgrade now in another terminal; check it near the end. Do apt-free items while B-05 and B-09 wait for apt's lock. [B-01] List human users, admins, and UID-0 accounts AREA: Account management (CIS Control 5) $ awk -F: '$3>=1000 && $3<65534 {print $1" uid="$3" shell="$7}' /etc/passwd $ awk -F: '$3==0 {print $1}' /etc/passwd $ getent group sudo admin adm wheel docker lxd disk $ awk -F: -v g="$(getent group sudo | cut -d: -f3)" '$4==g {print $1" has sudo as its primary group"}' /etc/passwd $ whoami; id (the account you work as, and its groups, before you judge anyone else's) GUI: Menu, Administration, Users and Groups. WHY: An extra UID-0 user is a second root. Members of sudo (or wheel) and admin (default sudoers grants %admin) hold root-level power; adm members read logs. NOTE: A user whose primary group is sudo (/etc/passwd field 4) holds admin rights yet hides from getent group sudo. ALSO: Treat docker, lxd, and disk members as root too: they can mount the host filesystem or read raw disks. [B-02] Remove or disable an unauthorized user AREA: Account management (CIS Control 5) $ id -u baduser (0 means a hidden root: skip the next two lines and follow the NOTE) $ sudo usermod -L -e 1 baduser; ps -o pid,unit,cmd -u baduser $ sudo loginctl disable-linger baduser; sudo loginctl terminate-user baduser; sudo pkill -KILL -u baduser; pgrep -u baduser $ sudo deluser --remove-home baduser $ sudo mkdir -p /root/removed-users && sudo deluser --remove-home --backup-to /root/removed-users baduser $ sudo userdel -r baduser $ sudo usermod -L -e 1 baduser && sudo usermod -s /usr/sbin/nologin baduser WHY: --remove-home clears planted files, deluser drops the crontab userdel leaves, and --backup-to keeps a root-only copy of the home as evidence. Lock, expiry, and nologin disable without destroying evidence: -e 1 stops SSH key sign-in, which -L alone leaves working. NOTE: The brief decides between delete and disable. Lock first, end the processes, then delete: when pgrep -u prints nothing, the account is idle. A service that runs as the user restarts its processes until you stop the unit ps names (sudo systemctl disable --now ). When id -u prints 0 the account is a hidden root: pkill -u on it ends every root process and deluser refuses it, so read its home (field 6 of getent passwd) and remove it with sudo userdel -f , adding -r only when that home is its own. [B-03] Fix admin group membership AREA: Account management (CIS Control 5) $ sudo gpasswd -d mallory sudo $ sudo loginctl terminate-user mallory (ends the open sessions, which keep the old groups) $ sudo usermod -aG sudo alice $ groups alice $ sudo adduser keola (when the brief lists an account this machine lacks: it sets a password and creates the home; the low-level form is sudo useradd -m -s /bin/bash keola, then sudo passwd keola) $ sudo addgroup designers && sudo gpasswd -M malia,keola designers (when the brief names a group and its members; -M sets the whole member list) GUI: Users and Groups: Account Type Standard or Administrator (Administrator = sudo group); the Groups row opens a tick list of every other group. WHY: Least privilege. -aG appends; -G alone replaces existing groups. Open sessions keep their starting groups: removed admins keep sudo until each session ends; new members gain it at next sign-in. [B-04] Passwords: strong, forced change, no empties, root locked AREA: Account management (CIS Control 5) $ sudo passwd alice $ sudo chage -d 0 alice $ awk -F: '$3>=1000 && $3<65534 {print $1}' /etc/passwd | grep -vx "${SUDO_USER:-$USER}" | xargs -r -n1 sudo chage -d 0 (every human account except yours) $ sudo awk -F: '$2=="" {print $1" HAS NO PASSWORD"}' /etc/shadow $ awk -F: '$2!="x" {print $1" has something other than x in /etc/passwd field 2"}' /etc/passwd $ getent group nopasswdlogin; sudo gpasswd -d nopasswdlogin $ sudo passwd -l root $ sudo passwd -S root (expect: root L) WHY: An empty /etc/shadow password or /etc/passwd field 2 means sign-in with Enter; sudo pwconv moves field 2, even an empty one, into /etc/shadow, so follow it with sudo passwd or sudo passwd -l . Locked root forces accountable sudo over a shared root password. NOTE: Record changed passwords safely (on paper, in a lab). Keep your own sign-in password unless the brief says otherwise; leave service and key-only accounts out of the bulk chage line. ALSO: Mint's login screen signs in every nopasswdlogin member without a password, and passwd leaves that membership in place, so check the group. [B-05] Password aging and quality AREA: Account management (CIS Control 5) $ sudo sed -i 's/^PASS_MAX_DAYS.*/PASS_MAX_DAYS\t60/' /etc/login.defs $ sudo sed -i 's/^PASS_MIN_DAYS.*/PASS_MIN_DAYS\t1/' /etc/login.defs $ sudo sed -i 's/^PASS_WARN_AGE.*/PASS_WARN_AGE\t7/' /etc/login.defs $ sudo sed -i 's/^UMASK.*/UMASK\t\t027/' /etc/login.defs $ diff /etc/login.defs.bak /etc/login.defs (compares the B-00 copy with your edit: < marks the old lines, > the new ones) $ sudo chage -M 60 -m 1 -W 7 alice $ for u in $(awk -F: '$3>=1000 && $3<=60000 {print $1}' /etc/passwd); do sudo chage -M 60 -m 1 -W 7 "$u"; done $ sudo passwd -S -a (min, max, and warn for every account) $ sudo apt install -y libpam-pwquality $ sudo nano /etc/security/pwquality.conf minlen = 12 difok = 3 maxrepeat = 3 enforce_for_root dcredit = -1 ucredit = -1 lcredit = -1 ocredit = -1 (only when the brief's policy asks for character classes) $ sudo nano /etc/pam.d/common-password password requisite pam_pwquality.so retry=3 (ensure present) ... pam_unix.so ... remember=5 (add to the pam_unix line) $ grep -n pam_pwquality /etc/pam.d/common-password $ sudo apt install -y libpwquality-tools && printf 'Summer2026\n' | pwscore WHY: login.defs covers only new users; chage (or the loop) sets existing ones. UMASK sets the starting permissions of new files through pam_umask; with a private group per user (USERGROUPS_ENAB yes) users see 0007. pwquality enforces complexity at each change, and remember= blocks reuse. Confirm with pwscore, which tests a password without changing one. NOTE: The scenario brief sets the numbers; these commands show one sample brief. The CIS Benchmark asks for a minlen of 14 or more, a history of 24 or more, a maximum age of 365 days or fewer, a minimum age of 1 day or more, and a UMASK of 027 or stricter; Defense Ladder s2 compares the CIS and NIST rulebooks, and s3 applies them on Linux. Leave obscure in place. Numbers on the pam_pwquality.so line override pwquality.conf, so keep them in the conf file and leave the PAM line at retry=3. Install libpam-pwquality before any hand edit to a common-* file (B-06): after one, pam-auth-update stops updating those files while apt still reports success, so the grep is the proof. Open a root shell before the loop: an account whose last change is older than the new maximum must change its password at its next sign-in, yours included. [B-06] Account lockout with pam_faillock AREA: Account management (CIS Control 5) $ sudo nano /etc/security/faillock.conf deny = 5 unlock_time = 1800 fail_interval = 900 audit $ sudo nano /etc/pam.d/common-auth (order matters) auth required pam_faillock.so preauth silent auth [success=1 default=ignore] pam_unix.so (existing line: set success=1, remove nullok) auth [default=die] pam_faillock.so authfail auth sufficient pam_faillock.so authsucc $ sudo nano /etc/pam.d/common-account (add first) account required pam_faillock.so $ su - alice (the lockout test, in a second terminal while your root shell stays open: each wrong password raises the count sudo faillock --user alice shows) $ sudo faillock --user alice $ sudo faillock --user alice --reset WHY: Stops online brute force. pam_faillock replaced pam_tally2, which current Ubuntu, Mint, and Debian releases have dropped. nullok allows empty passwords. faillock.conf holds the numbers; locking starts only once the PAM lines are in place, and numbers written on a PAM line override the file. Confirm with sudo faillock --user NAME after failed tries. NOTE: Test with su - alice in a second terminal before closing your root shell. Set the pam_unix line to [success=1 default=ignore] whatever number it had: some installs (Ubuntu desktop among them) ship [success=2] because a pam_sss line follows, and a 2 left in place sends every correct password past authsucc to pam_deny. unlock_time = 0 keeps a lock until sudo faillock --user NAME --reset or a reboot (the records live in /run/faillock); root stays exempt unless even_deny_root is set. Hand-added lines make pam-auth-update treat common-auth as locally modified; Hunter A-09 shows the managed route. On a desktop, the sufficient authsucc line ends the sign-in stack before pam_gnome_keyring runs, so the login keyring stays locked; the account line in common-account also resets the count, and A-09's managed route relies on it alone. [B-07] Firewall with ufw AREA: Secure configuration (CIS Control 4) $ sudo apt install -y ufw $ sudo ufw default deny incoming $ sudo ufw default allow outgoing $ sudo ufw allow 22/tcp $ sudo ufw enable $ sudo ufw logging on $ sudo ufw status verbose GUI: Menu, Preferences, Firewall Configuration (gufw): Status On, Incoming Deny, Outgoing Allow. WHY: Default-deny inbound covers the service you have not found yet. NOTE: Only allow 22/tcp if the brief requires SSH. Add rules for required services (80/tcp, 443/tcp, 21/tcp). [B-08] Updates: now and automatic (Update Manager) AREA: Patching (CIS Control 7) GUI: Update Manager (shield icon), Refresh, Select All, Install Updates GUI: Update Manager, Edit, Preferences, Automation: Apply updates automatically On, Remove obsolete kernels On; Other Updates: Update Flatpaks automatically On $ sudo mintupdate-cli upgrade -r -y --keep-configuration $ sudo mintupdate-automation upgrade enable (the terminal form of Update Manager's Automation switch; systemctl is-enabled mintupdate-automation-upgrade.timer then reads enabled) $ systemctl is-enabled mintupdate-automation-upgrade.timer; test -e /var/lib/linuxmint/mintupdate-automatic-upgrades-enabled && echo flag-on $ grep -qx -- '--keep-configuration' /etc/mintupdate-automatic-upgrades.conf 2>/dev/null || echo '--keep-configuration' | sudo tee -a /etc/mintupdate-automatic-upgrades.conf $ sudo apt update && sudo apt upgrade -y $ apt list --upgradable $ uname -r (the running kernel; after a kernel update, the new version runs once you reboot) $ sudo flatpak update -y $ apt-mark showhold; cat /etc/mintupdate.blacklist 2>/dev/null $ sudo apt-mark unhold (only when the brief allows updating it; apt-mark showhold lists the holds) $ sudo unattended-upgrade --dry-run -d 2>&1 | grep 'Allowed origins' (on Mint the origins name Linuxmint and the Mint codename, so they skip Ubuntu's noble-security pocket; Update Manager's automation patches it) WHY: Two separate goals: patched now, and configured to keep patching. Mint's automation runs only when both the timer and its flag file exist, and Flatpak apps update outside apt. -r refreshes the lists first, and --keep-configuration keeps your hardened configuration files when a package ships a new default (-y alone takes the package's version). Use Update Manager's automation rather than unattended-upgrades: on Mint its default origins carry the Mint name and codename, so they miss every Ubuntu security pocket (sudo unattended-upgrade --dry-run -d shows the Allowed origins). The daily job runs mintupdate-cli upgrade -r -y plus each line of /etc/mintupdate-automatic-upgrades.conf, so put --keep-configuration on its own line there too. NOTE: If Update Manager shows a broken mirror, fix Software Sources (I-11). A held package or a line in /etc/mintupdate.blacklist freezes that update even after everything else upgrades: sudo apt-mark unhold , and remove the line with sudoedit. [B-09] Remove unapproved software AREA: Secure configuration: software (CIS Controls 2 and 4) $ apt list --installed 2>/dev/null | grep -Ei 'nmap|zenmap|john|hydra|medusa|wireshark|tshark|aircrack|ophcrack|netcat|ncat|socat|telnetd|nikto|metasploit|hashcat|sqlmap|doona|torrent|deluge|amule|scanmem|gameconqueror|minetest|aisleriot|mahjongg|sudoku|freeciv|wesnoth' $ dpkg-query -W -f='${db:Status-Abbrev}\t${binary:Package}\t${Section}\t${binary:Summary}\n' | awk -F'\t' '$1 ~ /^ii/' | grep -iE 'games|crack|brute|sniff|exploit|scanner|torrent|peer-to-peer' $ zgrep -hE '^(Start-Date|Commandline)' /var/log/apt/history.log* $ dpkg -l | grep -i $ sudo apt purge --auto-remove nmap $ ls -la /usr/local/bin /usr/local/sbin /opt $ flatpak list $ flatpak remotes (flathub is Mint's default; any other remote needs a reason in the brief) $ flatpak uninstall -y GUI: Software Manager (mintinstall), Installed WHY: Hacking tools, games, and P2P clients are acceptable-use violations and attack surface. Description search finds tools by purpose, Section lists games, apt's history.log dates installs, and /usr/local holds hand-placed files. NOTE: Skip -y and read the REMOVED list first: --auto-remove also removes every package already marked as no longer required. Purge only what dpkg lists; apt stops at any unknown name. ALSO: Required packages (vsftpd, apache2, samba, openssh-server, mysql) stay; Watchman I-12 hardens them. Keep the stock cracklib-runtime and libcrack2 (pam_pwquality's dictionary), netcat-openbsd, and /etc/apt/preferences.d/nosnap.pref, which blocks snapd. apt misses Flatpak apps. [B-10] Find unapproved media files AREA: Data protection (CIS Control 3) $ sudo find /home /root /tmp /var /dev/shm /srv /opt /mnt /media /usr/local -xdev -type f \( -iname '*.mp3' -o -iname '*.mp4' -o -iname '*.m4a' -o -iname '*.mov' -o -iname '*.avi' -o -iname '*.mkv' -o -iname '*.webm' -o -iname '*.wmv' -o -iname '*.flv' -o -iname '*.mpg' -o -iname '*.mpeg' -o -iname '*.wav' -o -iname '*.flac' -o -iname '*.ogg' -o -iname '*.aac' -o -iname '*.wma' \) -not -path '/var/lib/snapd/*' -not -path '/var/lib/flatpak/*' -printf '%u\t%s\t%p\n' 2>/dev/null $ sudo find /home /root /tmp /var/tmp /dev/shm /srv /opt -xdev -type f -size +32k -exec file --mime-type {} + 2>/dev/null | grep -E ': (audio|video)/' $ sudo updatedb && sudo locate -i '*.mp3' (a quick second look; the index skips /tmp, /dev/shm, and /media, so find stays the proof) $ sudo sha256sum ''; sudo rm -- '' $ sudo mkdir -p /root/quarantine && sudo mv -- '' /root/quarantine/ (keeps the file as evidence when the brief asks for it, out of the user's reach) WHY: Many acceptable-use policies ban personal media; the search also surfaces hidden folders in /home and /var/tmp. file reads first bytes, so a song renamed notes.txt still shows as audio/mpeg. NOTE: App-folder hits (~/.local/share/flatpak, ~/snap, /opt/) are usually the app's; images go only if banned. Before rm, confirm paths against the brief and, for hash questions, run sha256sum (Defense Ladder s6). ALSO: -printf records owner, size, and path for change logs and investigation questions. Skipping /usr except /usr/local avoids OS sounds in /usr/share. Trust find; locate's nightly index skips /tmp and /dev/shm. [B-11] Services: what runs, what listens AREA: Secure configuration (CIS Control 4) $ systemctl list-units --type=service --state=running $ sudo ss -tulpn $ systemctl list-sockets --no-pager $ sudo systemctl disable --now vsftpd $ sudo systemctl disable --now telnet.socket inetd xinetd 2>/dev/null WHY: Telnet and FTP are cleartext; avahi, cups, rpcbind, nfs, and smb are exposure when unneeded. ss -tulpn shows the PID and program for every open port. NOTE: Required services stay. Check what starts a service before trusting it is off: a .socket unit can hold the port after its .service stops; ss shows systemd holding it. ALSO: disable --now stops units and keeps them off at boot. systemctl list-sockets pairs each socket with its service; disable both. I-07 traces an unknown listener to its unit and package. [B-12] Login Window: auto-login, guest sessions, screen lock AREA: Secure configuration (CIS Control 4) GUI: Menu, Administration, Login Window, Users: Guest sessions, Allow guest sessions Off; Automatic login, Username empty $ /usr/sbin/lightdm --show-config 2>&1 | grep -E 'allow-guest|autologin' $ sudo nano /etc/lightdm/lightdm.conf [Seat:*] autologin-user= allow-guest=false $ gsettings set org.cinnamon.desktop.screensaver lock-enabled true $ gsettings set org.cinnamon.desktop.screensaver lock-delay 0 $ gsettings set org.cinnamon.desktop.session idle-delay 300 GUI: Menu, Preferences, Screensaver: Lock the computer when put to sleep On, Delay before locking 0 WHY: Auto-login or a guest session means physical access is root in ten seconds; an unlocked idle desktop is the same thing a few minutes later. NOTE: Guest sessions come from LightDM, so passwd -l guest reports an unknown user. The Login Window's Guest sessions section appears only when the guest-account tool is installed. ALSO: /etc/lightdm/lightdm.conf is read last and overrides the lightdm.conf.d drop-ins; --show-config prints the value in force and its file. gsettings changes the current user only; repeat it per authorized user. [B-13] Find plaintext credential files and unapproved archives AREA: Data protection (CIS Control 3) $ sudo grep -rIil --exclude-dir=.cache --exclude-dir=.mozilla --exclude-dir=snap --exclude-dir=flatpak -E 'passw(or)?d|credential|secret|api[_-]?key|BEGIN [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY' /home /root /tmp /var/tmp /dev/shm /srv /opt /var/www 2>/dev/null $ sudo find /home /root /tmp /var/tmp /dev/shm /srv /opt -xdev -type f \( -iname '*.zip' -o -iname '*.7z' -o -iname '*.rar' -o -iname '*.tar' -o -iname '*.tgz' -o -iname '*.tar.gz' -o -iname '*.tar.xz' -o -iname '*.txt' \) -printf '%u\t%TY-%Tm-%Td\t%p\n' 2>/dev/null $ sudo unzip -l ''; sudo python3 -m zipfile -l ''; sudo tar -tvf '' $ file '' WHY: Password lists open every named account; archives slip tools past package searches. grep matches content under any name; unzip -l and tar -tvf list without extracting; file unmasks renamed ones. NOTE: Judge each .txt before deleting it: the brief, the investigation questions, and required documents stay. ~/.ssh keys are expected for users the brief lets sign in with keys (I-01). ALSO: Record the path and hash before removing anything (Defense Ladder s6). python3 -m zipfile works where unzip is absent. ------------------------------ WATCHMAN ---------------------------------------- Check the windows. SSH, sudoers, cron and timers, shell persistence, permissions and SUID, processes, AppArmor, auditing, apt sources, hardening the services you must keep, and browser policies. Learn it first: Defense Ladder j3, Debian and deeper Linux. https://freeapp4that.store/defense-ladder/#junior/j3 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- [I-01] SSH hardening, only when SSH is required AREA: Access control (CIS Control 6) $ sudo grep -rniE '^[[:space:]]*(Include|Match|PermitRootLogin|PermitEmptyPasswords|PermitUserEnvironment|PasswordAuthentication|AllowUsers)' /etc/ssh/sshd_config /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/ $ sudo less /etc/ssh/sshd_config (read the whole file before you edit it; / searches, n finds the next match, q quits) $ ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -C '@'; ssh-copy-id @ (on the admin's own machine, before PasswordAuthentication no; then test a key login) $ sudo nano /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/00-hardening.conf (or the main file, after reading every drop-in) PermitRootLogin no PermitEmptyPasswords no MaxAuthTries 3 LoginGraceTime 30 X11Forwarding no UsePAM yes PermitUserEnvironment no PasswordAuthentication yes or no per the brief AllowUsers alice bob $ sudo sshd -t && sudo systemctl restart ssh $ sudo sshd -T | grep -E '^(permitrootlogin|permitemptypasswords|permituserenvironment|maxauthtries|passwordauthentication|x11forwarding|allowusers) ' $ sudo sshd -T -C user=root,host=localhost,addr=127.0.0.1 | grep -i '^permitrootlogin' $ systemctl list-units 'ssh*' --no-pager (is ssh.socket the unit that listens on 22?) $ sudo systemctl daemon-reload && sudo systemctl restart ssh.socket (after a Port or ListenAddress change) $ sudo find / -name authorized_keys -exec ls -l {} \; -exec cat {} \; 2>/dev/null WHY: Root over SSH erases accountability and invites brute force; a planted authorized_keys backdoor survives every password fix. sshd -T, plus -C for Match blocks, confirms the values in force. NOTE: The && runs the restart only when sshd -t passes, so a config typo leaves the running server in place. sshd keeps the first value it reads, and Include reads sshd_config.d/*.conf in name order, so 00-hardening.conf wins over the shipped drop-ins and the main file; a drop-in that sorts before 00- still wins, and the grep and sshd -T show it. When ssh.socket owns port 22, a Port change or a disable aimed at ssh.service alone leaves the socket listening on the old port. Not required: sudo systemctl disable --now ssh.socket ssh.service && sudo apt purge -y openssh-server; confirm with sudo ss -tlpn that port 22 is closed. If sshd -t or sshd -T stops at 'Missing privilege separation directory: /run/sshd', run sudo mkdir -p /run/sshd and test again. [I-02] sudoers audit AREA: Access control (CIS Control 6) $ sudo grep -R -nE 'NOPASSWD|!authenticate|ALL=\(ALL' /etc/sudoers /etc/sudoers.d/ $ sudo visudo $ sudo visudo -f /etc/sudoers.d/ $ sudo -l -U mallory $ sudo visudo -c; sudo -k; sudo -v (expect a password prompt) $ sudoedit /etc/hosts (edits a copy as you, then installs it as root; grant sudoedit FILE in sudoers in place of an editor, which can open a root shell) WHY: A NOPASSWD ALL line in a sudoers.d drop-in is a silent root backdoor. Edit only with visudo, never nano: a syntax error locks everyone out of sudo. NOTE: Defaults !authenticate, global or Defaults:, acts like NOPASSWD on every rule it reaches. In the grep, single quotes keep bash from reading the ! as history. ALSO: sudo -l -U lists the user's rules, with Defaults under Matching Defaults entries. [I-03] Cron, at and systemd timers AREA: Malware defenses (CIS Control 10) $ cat /etc/crontab /etc/anacrontab 2>/dev/null; sudo ls -la /etc/cron.d /etc/cron.hourly /etc/cron.daily /etc/cron.weekly /etc/cron.monthly /var/spool/cron/crontabs $ sudo dpkg --verify cron cron-daemon-common $ dpkg -S /etc/cron.d/* /etc/cron.hourly/* /etc/cron.daily/* /etc/cron.weekly/* /etc/cron.monthly/* 2>&1 | grep 'no path found' $ for u in $(cut -d: -f1 /etc/passwd); do sudo crontab -l -u "$u" 2>/dev/null | sed "s/^/$u: /"; done $ systemctl list-timers --all $ sudo atq (command not found means at is absent, along with any at jobs) $ sudo atrm (removes one job that atq lists; read it first with sudo at -c ) $ sudo crontab -r -u baduser WHY: Cron re-creates users, re-opens ports, and re-installs tools every few minutes, so a fixed problem comes back. The stock /etc/crontab runs four run-parts jobs (hourly, daily, weekly, and monthly). NOTE: Before deleting a planted job, record and hash its program, end its process, and find other starters (I-07's grep -rlF). Cron rereads changed files every minute; fixes apply without restart. ALSO: cron-daemon-common owns /etc/crontab on 24.04, so dpkg --verify flags any edit (??5?????? c /etc/crontab) without a clean VM to compare against. dpkg -S marks hand-placed drop-ins with 'no path found'. [I-04] Shell and startup persistence AREA: Malware defenses (CIS Control 10) $ grep -R -nE 'alias|nc |ncat|bash -i|/dev/tcp|curl .*\| *sh|wget .*\| *sh' /etc/profile /etc/bash.bashrc /etc/profile.d/ /home/*/.bashrc /home/*/.profile /root/.bashrc 2>/dev/null $ cat /etc/rc.local 2>/dev/null; ls -la /etc/init.d/ /etc/systemd/system/ $ systemctl list-unit-files --state=enabled $ echo '' | base64 -d (decodes a blob found in a cron line or startup file; read what it would run before anything else) WHY: An alias on sudo or a reverse shell in .bashrc runs every time a terminal opens, including the one you use to fix things. [I-05] Critical file permissions, world-writable, SUID AREA: Access control (CIS Control 6) $ sudo chown root:shadow /etc/shadow /etc/gshadow && sudo chmod 640 /etc/shadow /etc/gshadow $ sudo chown root:root /etc/passwd /etc/group && sudo chmod 644 /etc/passwd /etc/group $ sudo chown root:root /etc/sudoers && sudo chmod 440 /etc/sudoers $ sudo chown root:root /boot/grub/grub.cfg && sudo chmod 600 /boot/grub/grub.cfg $ sudo stat -c '%a %U:%G %n' /etc/passwd /etc/group /etc/shadow /etc/gshadow /etc/passwd- /etc/group- /etc/shadow- /etc/gshadow- /boot/grub/grub.cfg $ sudo chmod 750 /home/* $ sudo find / -xdev -type f -perm -0002 -not -path '/proc/*' 2>/dev/null $ sudo find / -xdev -type d -perm -0002 ! -perm -1000 2>/dev/null $ sudo find / -xdev -type f \( -perm -4000 -o -perm -2000 \) 2>/dev/null $ sudo chmod u-s /path/to/evil $ sudo getcap -r / 2>/dev/null (cap_net_raw or cap_net_admin on a packaged network tool is normal; cap_setuid on python3 or perl gives root to anyone who runs it: sudo setcap -r ) $ sudo getfacl /etc/shadow /etc/sudoers (a + after the mode in ls -l means extra entries; sudo setfacl -x u: removes one, and sudo setfacl -b removes them all) WHY: Readable /etc/shadow allows offline cracking. Writable /etc/passwd gives root, as does SUID on bash, nmap, find, or vim (GTFOBins). grub.cfg holds the kernel command line and any GRUB password hash. NOTE: Investigate anything outside this expected list. SUID: passwd, su, sudo, mount, umount, chsh, chfn, gpasswd, newgrp, pkexec, fusermount3, ssh-keysign, dbus-daemon-launch-helper, and polkit-agent-helper-1; SGID: chage, expiry, unix_chkpwd, and crontab. ALSO: Compare unexpected SUID/SGID files with a clean VM of the same release. Backups ending in - (same data) take the main files' owner and mode. update-grub keeps your grub.cfg mode. [I-06] Hosts file and name resolution AREA: Secure configuration (CIS Control 4) $ cat /etc/hosts $ resolvectl status 2>/dev/null | grep -i 'DNS Servers' $ ip -br a; ip route (addresses and the default route; explain anything the brief leaves out) $ ip -br link (every interface; an unexpected tun0, wg0, or second NIC needs an explanation) $ ip neigh (the MAC address behind each neighbor; two addresses that share one MAC suggest ARP spoofing) $ traceroute -n security.ubuntu.com (hop 1 should be the gateway the brief names; a different first hop means a changed route; sudo apt install traceroute when it is missing, or use tracepath) $ dig +short ; dig -x
(what DNS answers, to compare with /etc/hosts; sudo apt install bind9-dnsutils when dig is missing) $ nmcli connection show (saved network profiles; an unknown VPN or Wi-Fi profile needs an explanation) WHY: Redirecting packages.linuxmint.com or security.ubuntu.com to 127.0.0.1 breaks updates silently. [I-07] Processes and connections: find the backdoor AREA: Malware defenses (CIS Control 10) $ ps -eo pid,ppid,user,cmd --sort=-%cpu | head -25 $ top (live CPU use; a miner sits at the top of the list; q quits) $ ps -ef | grep -Ei 'nc |ncat|socat|bash -i|python.* -c|perl -e|xmrig|miner' | grep -v grep $ pstree -p (who started whom: a shell under apache2 or cron is a lead) $ sudo ss -tulpn; sudo lsof -i -P -n | grep -Ei 'LISTEN|ESTABLISHED' $ sudo ls -l /proc//exe; sudo cat /proc//cmdline | tr '\0' ' ' $ systemctl status --no-pager; dpkg -S "$(sudo readlink -f /proc//exe)" $ systemctl cat (the unit file plus every drop-in; ExecStart names the program it runs) $ sudo grep -rlF '' /etc /var/spool/cron /home /root 2>/dev/null $ sudo kill -9 WHY: Killing a process is pointless unless you also remove its starter (cron, a systemd unit, rc.local, .bashrc): find the parent, then the file. systemctl status names the unit to disable; dpkg -S 'no path found' means no package installed it (on 24.04 retry with /bin in place of /usr/bin first, since they merge); grep -rlF lists every file that starts it. NOTE: When systemctl status names cron.service, rc-local.service, inetd.service, or a session scope, the process is that starter's child: remove the planted line, end the process, keep the starter. A packaged python3, nc, or bash in /proc//exe hides what it runs, so read cmdline; an exe path ending in (deleted) is a finding. [I-08] AppArmor enforcing AREA: Secure configuration (CIS Control 4) $ sudo apt install -y apparmor-utils $ sudo systemctl enable --now apparmor $ sudo aa-status $ sudo aa-enforce /etc/apparmor.d/ (only profiles aa-status lists in complain mode) $ sudo aa-logprof (reads AppArmor events from the logs and offers a rule for each; allow only what the program needs) WHY: Mandatory access control: a compromised service cannot read files outside its profile. Ubuntu and Mint enable it by default, so a stopped or disabled AppArmor is itself a finding. NOTE: Enforce profiles by name: aa-enforce /etc/apparmor.d/* also enforces shipped, deliberately unconfined profiles that only grant one permission (see Version notes), breaking those apps. Test the brief's required apps after. [I-09] Logging and audit AREA: Audit logging (CIS Control 8) $ systemctl status rsyslog --no-pager $ df -h /var (a full /var stops the logs; keep space free before you turn auditing up) $ sudo apt install -y auditd && sudo systemctl enable --now auditd $ sudo nano /etc/audit/rules.d/hardening.rules -w /etc/passwd -p wa -k identity -w /etc/shadow -p wa -k identity -w /etc/sudoers -p wa -k sudoers -w /etc/sudoers.d/ -p wa -k sudoers $ sudo augenrules --load && sudo auditctl -l $ sudo ausearch -k identity $ sudo aureport -x --summary (audit events per program; an unfamiliar path is a lead) $ sudo grep -rnE 'audit=(0|off)' /etc/default/grub /etc/default/grub.d/ 2>/dev/null $ sudo mkdir -p /etc/default/grub.d && echo 'GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX="$GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX audit=1 audit_backlog_limit=8192"' | sudo tee /etc/default/grub.d/99-audit.cfg && sudo update-grub $ grep -oE 'audit=[^ ]+' /proc/cmdline (after a reboot: audit=1) $ last; lastlog; sudo lastb | head; who; w $ sudo grep -E 'Accepted|Failed|useradd|userdel|usermod' /var/log/auth.log | tail -40 $ sudo grep 'Failed password' /var/log/auth.log | wc -l (one number to track between checks; grep -c counts the same lines) $ sudo grep 'Failed password' /var/log/auth.log | awk '{print $(NF-3)}' | sort | uniq -c | sort -rn | head (failed sign-ins counted per source address) $ journalctl -p err -b --no-pager | tail $ journalctl --list-boots (a single line after several reboots means the journal forgets each boot: set Storage=persistent in /etc/systemd/journald.conf) $ logger -t hardening 'baseline done'; journalctl -t hardening --no-pager (a test line that shows up proves logging works end to end) $ date (the local time the logs stamp; timedatectl status below shows whether NTP keeps it right) $ timedatectl status (System clock synchronized: yes and NTP service: active keep log times comparable; when either reads otherwise, run sudo timedatectl set-ntp true) WHY: Audit rules answer who changed /etc/passwd and when. auditd starts mid-boot, so audit=1 makes the kernel record from the first process; audit=0 anywhere on the kernel line keeps auditing off. NOTE: If rsyslog is not installed (journald only, as on a default Debian install), use journalctl. [I-10] Account hygiene: shells, system accounts, odd groups AREA: Account management (CIS Control 5) $ grep -vE 'nologin|/bin/false|/bin/sync' /etc/passwd $ sudo usermod -s /usr/sbin/nologin $ sudo chage -l alice $ sudo lslogins -u (every human account with its process count, lock state, and last login in one table) $ getent group root shadow adm systemd-journal sudo admin docker lxd disk $ for g in shadow disk adm systemd-journal docker lxd; do awk -F: -v g="$(getent group "$g" | cut -d: -f3)" -v n="$g" 'g!="" && $4==g {print $1" has primary group "n}' /etc/passwd; done $ sudo gpasswd -d shadow WHY: A service account with /bin/bash is a login. Planted group memberships grant quiet privilege: disk reads raw disks, including the shadow file; adm and systemd-journal read the whole journal. NOTE: A primary group of shadow reads every hash without appearing in the member list. ALSO: gpasswd keeps /etc/group and /etc/gshadow in step; a hand edit can split them. [I-11] Software Sources hygiene AREA: Patching (CIS Control 7) $ cat /etc/apt/sources.list.d/official-package-repositories.list /etc/apt/sources.list.d/*.list 2>/dev/null GUI: Menu, Administration, Software Sources: Official repositories, PPAs, Additional repositories $ ls -l /etc/apt/trusted.gpg.d/ /etc/apt/keyrings/ /etc/apt/preferences.d/ 2>/dev/null $ apt-cache policy | grep -- '-security' (expect 500 lines for noble-security; apt policy prints the same table) $ sudo apt update WHY: A malicious repository or key means apt upgrade installs the attacker's packages. Keep the official packages.linuxmint.com, archive.ubuntu.com, and security.ubuntu.com lines; remove unknown PPAs and keys. NOTE: nosnap.pref in preferences.d is Mint's own and stays. A pin in preferences.d that lowers noble-security switches security updates off quietly; apt-cache policy shows it. [I-12] Harden required services instead of removing them AREA: Secure configuration (CIS Control 4) vsftpd /etc/vsftpd.conf: anonymous_enable=NO local_enable=YES write_enable=NO chroot_local_user=YES ssl_enable=YES $ sudo systemctl restart vsftpd && systemctl is-active vsftpd $ openssl s_client -connect 127.0.0.1:21 -starttls ftp -brief : Options FollowSymLinks $ sudo apache2ctl configtest && sudo systemctl restart apache2 (apachectl configtest is the same check) $ curl -sI http://127.0.0.1/ | grep -i '^server:'; curl -si -X TRACE http://127.0.0.1/ | head -1 $ openssl x509 -in /etc/ssl/certs/ssl-cert-snakeoil.pem -noout -subject -issuer -dates (issuer equal to subject means self-signed; notAfter is the expiry) nginx /etc/nginx/nginx.conf http block: server_tokens off; ssl_protocols TLSv1.2 TLSv1.3; $ sudo nginx -t && sudo systemctl reload nginx samba /etc/samba/smb.conf [global]: map to guest = Never restrict anonymous = 2 ; per share: guest ok = no $ testparm && sudo systemctl restart smbd $ sudo mysql_secure_installation (on MariaDB the same script is sudo mariadb-secure-installation) $ sudo mysql -e "SELECT user, host, plugin FROM mysql.user;" (an empty user name, or root with host %, is a finding) mysql /etc/mysql/mysql.conf.d/mysqld.cnf: bind-address = 127.0.0.1 $ sudo systemctl restart mysql $ systemd-analyze security (an exposure level from 0 to 10, where lower is safer; each flagged line names a sandbox setting to add with systemctl edit) $ sudo systemctl edit (a drop-in for sandboxing, such as NoNewPrivileges=yes and ProtectSystem=full; restart it and confirm it stays active, since ProtectSystem=strict also needs ReadWritePaths= for the service's data and logs; systemd-analyze security shows the change) WHY: Required services must keep running, so harden their configs instead; anonymous FTP is the classic finding. /etc/ftpusers lists the accounts FTP refuses, root included, and openssl s_client shows TLS working. NOTE: A bad line, like spaces around =, stops vsftpd; is-active proves the restart took. Apache refuses mixed signed and plain options (Options -Indexes FollowSymLinks); write Options FollowSymLinks or -Indexes +FollowSymLinks. ALSO: After the restarts, curl should print Server: Apache (or nginx) without a version, and TRACE should answer 405. If curl is missing, run sudo apt install curl. [I-13] Browser protections (Firefox and Chromium) AREA: Secure configuration (CIS Control 4) $ dpkg -l firefox chromium 2>/dev/null | grep '^ii' $ sudo mkdir -p /etc/firefox/policies $ sudo cp -n /usr/lib/firefox/distribution/policies.json /etc/firefox/policies/ 2>/dev/null $ sudo nano /etc/firefox/policies/policies.json (add these keys inside "policies") "DisableSecurityBypass": {"SafeBrowsing": true}, "PopupBlocking": {"Default": true, "Locked": true}, "HttpsOnlyMode": "force_enabled", "Preferences": {"browser.safebrowsing.malware.enabled": {"Value": true, "Status": "locked"}, "browser.safebrowsing.phishing.enabled": {"Value": true, "Status": "locked"}, "browser.safebrowsing.downloads.enabled": {"Value": true, "Status": "locked"}, "xpinstall.whitelist.required": {"Value": true, "Status": "locked"}} $ python3 -m json.tool /etc/firefox/policies/policies.json >/dev/null && echo valid GUI: Firefox, about:policies: the Active tab lists each policy, and the Errors tab stays empty $ sudo find /home /root -type f \( -name prefs.js -o -name user.js \) -path '*firefox*' -exec grep -HE 'safebrowsing|https_only_mode|disable_open_during_load|xpinstall' {} + 2>/dev/null $ sudo mkdir -p /etc/chromium/policies/managed && echo '{"SafeBrowsingProtectionLevel": 2}' | sudo tee /etc/chromium/policies/managed/hardening.json GUI: Chromium, chrome://policy, Reload policies: SafeBrowsingProtectionLevel 2, status OK WHY: Safe Browsing blocks known phishing and malware pages and downloads, HTTPS-Only Mode asks before loading an unencrypted page, and the add-on warning stops a site installing an extension on its own. A policy file locks a setting for every user; a Settings checkbox covers one profile. A user.js line restores its value at every start, so a protection turned off there is a persistence finding. NOTE: /etc/firefox/policies/policies.json replaces the shipped copy: cp that copy there first, keeping the {"policies": { ... }} wrapper. Use "HttpsOnlyMode": "enabled" rather than "force_enabled" for an HTTP-only named site; restart Firefox. ------------------------------ HUNTER ------------------------------------------ Hunt and harden. Kernel and network sysctl, rootkits and tampered packages, the immutable-flag trap, PAM internals and managed PAM profiles, forensics tooling, firewall depth, version notes, and a Lynis self-audit. Learn it first: Defense Ladder se1, FreeBSD: Hunting on any Unix. https://freeapp4that.store/defense-ladder/#senior/se1 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- [A-01] Kernel and network hardening with sysctl AREA: Secure configuration (CIS Control 4) $ sudo nano /etc/sysctl.d/99-hardening.conf net.ipv4.ip_forward = 0 net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects = 0 net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects = 0 net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects = 0 net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects = 0 net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route = 0 net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route = 0 net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter = 1 net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter = 1 net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians = 1 net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies = 1 net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts = 1 net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses = 1 net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects = 0 net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects = 0 net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route = 0 net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route = 0 kernel.randomize_va_space = 2 kernel.kptr_restrict = 2 kernel.dmesg_restrict = 1 kernel.sysrq = 0 fs.protected_hardlinks = 1 fs.protected_symlinks = 1 fs.suid_dumpable = 0 $ sudo sysctl --system $ sysctl net.ipv4.ip_forward kernel.randomize_va_space $ dmesg | tail (as a regular user, 'Operation not permitted' proves kernel.dmesg_restrict = 1) $ sysctl -a 2>/dev/null | grep -E 'rp_filter|accept_redirects' (an interface that still reads 2 keeps loose checking: sudo sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf..rp_filter=1) $ sudo grep -rnE 'ip_forward|randomize_va_space|accept_redirects|rp_filter' /etc/sysctl.conf /etc/sysctl.d/ /etc/ufw/sysctl.conf 2>/dev/null WHY: ip_forward=1 enables pivoting; syncookies and rp_filter blunt SYN floods and spoofing; ASLR 2 and suid_dumpable 0 raise exploit cost. sysctl --system loads /etc/sysctl.d/ too; sysctl -p reads /etc/sysctl.conf alone. NOTE: ip_forward goes first: changing it resets the interface settings and would undo lines above it. A bad change can leave ip_forward=1 or randomize_va_space=0 in /etc/sysctl.conf, a file in /etc/sysctl.d/, or /etc/ufw/sysctl.conf, which ufw applies at each start (its keys use slashes: net/ipv4/ip_forward). The stock ufw file sets log_martians=0, so with ufw on, set its two log_martians lines to 1 as well. On 24.04, /etc/sysctl.conf applies last and wins. Stock rp_filter is 2 (loose) in /etc/sysctl.d/10-network-security.conf; 1 is strict and can drop traffic on a host with two network paths. The kernel takes the higher of the all value and each interface value for rp_filter, so read both back. [A-02] Rootkits, tampered packages, malware AREA: Malware defenses (CIS Control 10) $ sudo apt install -y rkhunter chkrootkit debsums clamav $ sudo debsums -c; sudo debsums -ce $ sudo rkhunter --propupd && sudo rkhunter --check --sk $ sudo chkrootkit $ sudo systemctl stop clamav-freshclam; sudo freshclam; sudo systemctl start clamav-freshclam; sudo clamscan -r -i --log=/root/clamscan.log /home /tmp /var/tmp /opt $ clamscan --version (the signature date proves the database loaded) $ which nc ncat netcat socat; sudo find / -xdev -type f \( -name nc -o -name ncat -o -name netcat -o -name socat \) 2>/dev/null $ sudo apt install -y --no-install-recommends aide aide-common && sudo aideinit -y -f (last step of the session) $ sudo aide --check --config /etc/aide/aide.conf WHY: debsums catches a replaced /bin/ls or sshd; rkhunter knows rootkit paths; AIDE reports changes since its baseline. Netcat is the backdoor toolkit: /usr/bin/nc (netcat-openbsd) is stock; hunt copies outside packages. NOTE: Run debsums before rkhunter --propupd, or rkhunter's baseline trusts tampered files. debsums -c skips conffiles; -ce lists edited dpkg ones, /etc/crontab included. sshd_config is ucf-managed, so compare it with /usr/share/openssh/sshd_config. ALSO: clamscan's signatures need internet and about 1.2 GiB of RAM: with 2 GB, close other programs or scan folder by folder. Installing AIDE with --no-install-recommends skips postfix and port 25. [A-03] The lsattr trap, core dumps, Ctrl-Alt-Del AREA: Secure configuration (CIS Control 4) $ sudo lsattr /etc/passwd /etc/shadow /etc/sudoers /etc/ssh/sshd_config $ sudo chattr -i /etc/passwd $ sudo nano /etc/security/limits.conf * hard core 0 $ sudo systemctl mask ctrl-alt-del.target $ findmnt /tmp; findmnt /dev/shm (OPTIONS should read nodev and nosuid, plus noexec where the brief allows; empty output means /tmp lives on the root file system) $ lsblk -f (FSTYPE crypto_LUKS means full-disk encryption; record it, since it is chosen at install time) $ mokutil --sb-state (SecureBoot enabled means the firmware checks each signed step of the boot chain; a BIOS-booted VM prints 'EFI variables are not supported on this system') $ grub-mkpasswd-pbkdf2 (hashes a GRUB superuser password for /etc/grub.d/40_custom: set superusers="root" and password_pbkdf2 root ; mark the normal entry --unrestricted (CLASS line in /etc/grub.d/10_linux) so unattended reboots still start; then sudo update-grub) WHY: An immutable flag set by attackers is the most common reason a fix refuses to stick on a compromised machine, so run lsattr first. NOTE: With the flag set, useradd, passwd, and chage fail even as root, with misleading errors like 'useradd: cannot open /etc/passwd' or 'Authentication token manipulation error'. [A-04] PAM deep dive AREA: Access control (CIS Control 6) required: must pass, keep going. requisite: must pass, stop on fail. sufficient: pass means done. optional. $ grep -nE 'nullok|pam_permit|pam_succeed_if' /etc/pam.d/common-auth /etc/pam.d/sudo /etc/pam.d/login /etc/pam.d/sshd $ sudo sed -i 's/ nullok//g' /etc/pam.d/common-auth $ grep -n 'pam_unix' /etc/pam.d/common-password $ sudo awk -F: '{h=$2; sub(/^!+/,"",h); if (h ~ /^[$](1|5|6)[$]/) print $1, substr(h,1,3)}' /etc/shadow WHY: auth sufficient pam_permit.so atop common-auth lets any password in. Expect yescrypt (the Ubuntu and Mint default), obscure, and remember=5 on the pam_unix line. NOTE: Adding sha512 to the pam_unix line downgrades every new hash. A hash changes only when its password changes, so old-format hashes remain until reset. ALSO: The awk line lists accounts still on MD5 ($1$), SHA-256 ($5$), or SHA-512 ($6$); reset those passwords. [A-05] Forensics toolkit AREA: Investigation (forensics basics) $ sudo find / -xdev -type f -newermt "2026-10-01" -not -path '/proc/*' -not -path '/sys/*' -not -path '/var/lib/*' 2>/dev/null | head -60 $ sudo find / -xdev \( -nouser -o -nogroup \) 2>/dev/null $ sudo find / -xdev -uid -ls 2>/dev/null; getent passwd (empty getent output: the owner was deleted) $ sudo find /home /root /tmp /var/tmp /dev/shm -name '.*' -type f 2>/dev/null $ sudo find /home /root /tmp /var/tmp /dev/shm /opt /srv /usr/local -xdev -type f -size -1024k -not -path '*/.mozilla/*' -not -path '*/snap/*' -not -path '*/.local/share/flatpak/*' -not -path '*/.var/app/*' -exec file {} + 2>/dev/null | grep -iE 'python|perl|shell script|ELF' $ comm -13 <(dpkg-query -L $(dpkg-query -W -f='${binary:Package} ') 2>/dev/null | sed -E 's#^/(s?bin)/#/usr/\1/#' | sort -u) <(sudo find /usr/bin /usr/sbin /usr/local/bin /usr/local/sbin -xdev -type f | sort -u) $ stat ; file ; strings | head; md5sum ; sha1sum ; sha256sum ; sha512sum $ xxd | head -2 (the first bytes give the real type, whatever the name claims: 7f45 4c46 is ELF, 2550 4446 is PDF; sudo apt install xxd when it is missing) $ sudo journalctl _COMM=sudo --no-pager | tail -40 $ history; sudo sh -c 'tail -n 20 /home/*/.bash_history /root/.bash_history' 2>/dev/null (the last lines each account typed; the glob runs as root because home folders are 750; an empty history, or one linked to /dev/null, is itself a finding) $ sudo grep -E 'useradd|userdel|usermod|groupadd|passwd' /var/log/auth.log* 2>/dev/null $ sudo tcpdump -n -i any -c 20 port 4444 (who talks to a suspicious port; -c stops after 20 packets; sudo apt install tcpdump when it is missing) WHY: Investigation questions usually want a hash, a timestamp, a hidden path, or who ran what. find -newermt shows recent changes; the file command reads first bytes, exposing renamed scripts. NOTE: comm prints system programs missing from every package's file list. A few come from install scripts, so confirm with dpkg -S before calling one planted. ALSO: find -uid takes a number, so it still works after the account is deleted. [A-06] Firewall depth: ufw internals, IPv6, unneeded daemons AREA: Secure configuration (CIS Control 4) $ sudo ufw status numbered; sudo ufw delete $ sudo ufw show added; sudo ufw show raw | less (added lists your rules as typed; raw is the full loaded set, before.rules included) $ grep IPV6 /etc/default/ufw $ sudo iptables -S; sudo nft list ruleset 2>/dev/null | head -60 $ sudo grep -nE 'ACCEPT.*--dport' /etc/ufw/before.rules /etc/ufw/user.rules 2>/dev/null $ sudo systemctl disable --now avahi-daemon cups rpcbind nfs-server bluetooth 2>/dev/null WHY: A rule planted in before.rules never shows in ufw status. IPv6 off in ufw leaves half the stack unfiltered. [A-07] Version notes: Linux Mint 22.3 and its Ubuntu base Mint 22.3 "Zena" = Ubuntu 24.04 (noble) package base, Cinnamon 6.6: apt, pam_faillock, yescrypt hashes, AppArmor and ufw behave as on Ubuntu 24.04 openssh-server (when installed) is socket-activated: ssh.socket holds port 22, so disable it too; after a Port or ListenAddress change run systemctl daemon-reload, then systemctl restart ssh.socket The noble AppArmor package ships some profiles in unconfined mode on purpose (they only grant user namespaces): never aa-enforce /etc/apparmor.d/* LightDM + Cinnamon: /etc/lightdm/lightdm.conf, cinnamon-settings, gsettings org.cinnamon.* Update Manager (mintupdate) replaces Software Updater; mintupdate-cli for the terminal No snapd (nosnap.pref); Flatpak is enabled: flatpak list Timeshift is preinstalled: snapshot first on practice VMs Mint sources: /etc/apt/sources.list.d/official-package-repositories.list (zena and noble lines) WHY: Knowing which tools Mint ships keeps you from hunting for a GNOME setting that is not there, and from treating Mint's own files as findings. [A-08] Verify loop, every thirty minutes $ sudo ss -tulpn; getent group sudo admin; awk -F: '$3==0' /etc/passwd $ sudo ufw status verbose; sudo aa-status | head -3; systemctl is-active auditd $ sudo awk -F: '$2==""' /etc/shadow; awk -F: '$2!="x"' /etc/passwd; getent group nopasswdlogin; sudo lsattr /etc/passwd /etc/shadow WHY: Cron and timers undo fixes. Re-checking catches the undo, and anything you broke, before a user does. [A-09] Lockout the managed way: pam-auth-update profiles AREA: Account management (CIS Control 5) $ ls /usr/share/pam-configs/; grep '^Module:' /var/lib/pam/auth $ sudo nano /usr/share/pam-configs/faillock Name: Enable pam_faillock to deny access Default: yes Priority: 0 Auth-Type: Primary Auth: [default=die] pam_faillock.so authfail $ sudo nano /usr/share/pam-configs/faillock_notify Name: Notify of failed login attempts and reset count upon success Default: yes Priority: 1024 Auth-Type: Primary Auth: requisite pam_faillock.so preauth Account-Type: Primary Account: required pam_faillock.so $ sudo pam-auth-update --enable faillock faillock_notify $ grep -n pam_faillock /etc/pam.d/common-auth /etc/pam.d/common-account WHY: pam-auth-update builds common-auth and common-account from /usr/share/pam-configs profiles, computing [success=N] jumps, so both files work on Ubuntu and Mint and survive package installs. Priority 1024 precedes pam_unix (256); 0 follows. NOTE: After B-06's hand edit, pam-auth-update prints 'Local modifications to /etc/pam.d/common-*, not updating.' yet exits 0: always reread common-auth. Restore your backup before rerunning, or add --force. faillock.conf keeps the numbers. ALSO: --force leaves /etc/pam.d/common-*.pam-old copies (move them out) and restores nullok (strip it, A-04). Retest su - (B-06) with a root shell open. Indent module lines under Auth: or Account: fields. [A-10] Self-audit with Lynis AREA: Secure configuration (CIS Control 4) $ sudo apt install -y lynis $ sudo lynis audit system --quick $ sudo grep -E '^(warning|suggestion)' /var/log/lynis-report.dat $ sudo grep '^hardening_index=' /var/log/lynis-report.dat $ sudo lynis show details WHY: Lynis reads the system without changing it, then reports warnings, suggestions, and a hardening index from 0 to 100. Run it before and after fixes; the index should climb. NOTE: A suggestion is a lead to check, since some would break a service the brief requires. show details prints the log lines behind one test ID from the report. [A-11] Investigate a live process: /proc, tracers, and hidden PIDs AREA: Malware defenses (CIS Control 10) $ sudo ls -l /proc//exe (a [kworker] or other kernel-thread name with a program file is a disguise) $ tr '\0' ' ' < /proc//cmdline; grep -E 'Name|PPid|Uid' /proc//status $ sudo cat /proc//environ | tr '\0' '\n' (LD_PRELOAD here loads a library ahead of all others) $ sudo ls -l /proc//fd; sudo cat /proc//maps $ sudo pmap $ ldd /path/to/program (a library in maps that ldd leaves out came from LD_PRELOAD or /etc/ld.so.preload) $ sudo strace -p -e trace=network (connect() shows the address it calls; Ctrl+C detaches) $ sudo strace -f -p -e trace=file -s 200 -o /root/trace.txt $ sudo strace -p -e trace=process $ sudo apt install -y ltrace inotify-tools unhide $ sudo ltrace -p -e connect $ sudo fuser -v /path/to/file; sudo fuser -v -n tcp $ sudo fuser -k -n tcp (kills every process on the port: read the -v list first) $ sudo inotifywait -m -r -e modify,create,delete /etc /var/spool/cron $ sudo unhide proc; sudo unhide sys; sudo unhide-tcp WHY: A process can rename itself, so read what the kernel records: its program file, open files, mapped libraries, and starting environment. A tracer then shows what it does right now, such as the address it calls and the files it reads. Record each answer, stop it, then remove its starter. NOTE: Yama's kernel.yama.ptrace_scope is 1 on Linux Mint, so a plain user may trace only its own children: attach with sudo. A real kernel thread shows PPid 2 and an empty exe link. A PID that unhide finds and ps leaves out points at a changed ps (sudo debsums -s) or a rootkit. ltrace, inotify-tools, and unhide install from universe. ------------------------------ FIX OR BREAK? (practice cards) ------------------ Brief: Authorized administrators: alice. Authorized users: bob, carol. Action: Run sudo gpasswd -d bob sudo because bob is in the sudo group. Call: FIX. The brief lists bob as a standard user. Removing that account from sudo is least privilege. Brief: This server hosts the company website with Apache. Action: Run sudo apt purge apache2 to remove the web server. Call: BREAKS IT. Required service. Keep it running and harden it: ServerTokens Prod, no directory listing, updates. Brief: Investigation 2: what is the SHA-256 hash of /home/bob/Music/track.mp3? Action: Delete all media files, then answer the investigation questions. Call: CHECK FIRST. Hash it first, then delete. Evidence before cleanup. Brief: Nothing in the brief mentions /opt/backup-agent. Action: Delete /opt/backup-agent because it is not a standard package. Call: CHECK FIRST. Unrecognized is distinct from unauthorized. Find what runs it (a systemd unit, a cron job, the file owner) and ask the system owner before removing a backup or monitoring agent. Brief: Only alice may log in with SSH; SSH must stay available. Action: Run sudo systemctl disable --now ssh.socket ssh.service. Call: BREAKS IT. SSH is required. Set PermitRootLogin no and AllowUsers alice, and keep it running; ssh.socket is what listens on port 22, so leave it enabled. Brief: No games are allowed on company machines. Action: Run sudo apt purge --auto-remove minetest after confirming no investigation question mentions it, and read the REMOVED list before answering Y. Call: FIX. Acceptable-use violation, and confirmed it is not evidence. Log the removal. Brief: The company uses Samba for the shared drive. Action: Set guest ok = no and map to guest = Never in smb.conf and restart smbd. Call: FIX. Hardening a required service without breaking it. Exactly the job. Brief: Standard users must not be able to run commands as root. Action: Delete the line '%sudo ALL=(ALL:ALL) ALL' from /etc/sudoers with nano. Call: BREAKS IT. That removes sudo for the real admins, and editing with nano risks a syntax error that breaks sudo for everyone. Use visudo and remove only the unauthorized entries. Brief: The machine must not forward traffic between its interfaces. Action: Set net.ipv4.ip_forward = 0 and run sudo sysctl --system. Call: FIX. Matches the brief and removes a pivot. Brief: Your useradd and passwd commands keep failing on this machine with confusing errors, even under sudo. Action: Reinstall the passwd package. Call: CHECK FIRST. Check sudo lsattr /etc/passwd /etc/shadow first. The immutable flag is the usual cause, and a reinstall leaves it in place. Brief: Timeshift is used for backups on this workstation. Action: Run sudo apt purge timeshift because backups are not a security control. Call: BREAKS IT. Required software per the brief. Leave it; snapshots are also your own undo button. Brief: The design team installs approved apps through Flatpak. Action: Run sudo apt purge flatpak to remove an unneeded package manager. Call: BREAKS IT. Required tooling. Audit flatpak list for unapproved apps instead. Brief: Lock an account after three failed sign-ins until an admin releases it. Action: Set deny = 3 and unlock_time = 0 in /etc/security/faillock.conf, then move on. Call: CHECK FIRST. faillock.conf only holds the numbers. Confirm the pam_faillock lines are in common-auth (grep -n pam_faillock /etc/pam.d/common-auth); locking starts only with them. Brief: Every account must need a password to sign in. Action: Set a password with sudo passwd for each account, then move on. Call: CHECK FIRST. On Mint, members of nopasswdlogin still sign in at the login screen with no password, and passwd leaves that membership in place. Run getent group nopasswdlogin and remove each member with sudo gpasswd -d. Brief: Passwords must meet a quality policy. Action: Type password requisite pam_pwquality.so retry=3 into common-password by hand, then run sudo apt install -y libpam-pwquality. Call: CHECK FIRST. The hand-added line makes pam-auth-update treat common-password as locally modified, so the package adds nothing and apt still reports success. Install first, then read it back with grep -n pam_pwquality /etc/pam.d/common-password (B-05). Brief: Passwords must be at least 14 characters. Action: Set minlen = 14 in /etc/security/pwquality.conf while the pam_pwquality.so line still reads retry=3 minlen=8, then move on. Call: CHECK FIRST. Numbers on the pam_pwquality.so line override pwquality.conf, so 8 still applies. Remove minlen=8 from the PAM line and keep the number in the conf file (B-05). Brief: The brief requires SSH and the company website, behind a firewall. Action: Run sudo ufw disable because the website stopped loading after you enabled ufw. Call: BREAKS IT. Turning ufw off exposes every listening port. Allow the site instead: sudo ufw allow 80/tcp (and 443/tcp for HTTPS), then check sudo ufw status numbered. ------------------------------ SPOT THE FINDING (output snippets) -------------- Lines from /etc/passwd. Tap the finding. root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash alice:x:1000:1000:Alice:/home/alice:/bin/bash >> sysadm:x:0:0::/home/sysadm:/bin/bash www-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/usr/sbin/nologin WHY: A second UID-0 account is a second root. Remove it (after noting it for the investigation). Output of getent group sudo. Brief: alice is the only admin. Tap the finding. >> sudo:x:27:alice,mallory adm:x:4:syslog,alice users:x:100: plugdev:x:46:alice WHY: mallory in the sudo group is an unauthorized admin: sudo gpasswd -d mallory sudo. Lines from /etc/shadow. Tap the finding. alice:$y$j9T$...:19600:0:99999:7::: >> bob::19600:0:99999:7::: carol:!:19600:0:99999:7::: daemon:*:19600:0:99999:7::: WHY: An empty second field means bob logs in with no password. ! and * mean locked, which is fine. More lines from /etc/passwd. Tap the finding. root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash alice:x:1000:1000:Alice:/home/alice:/bin/bash >> keola::1003:1003::/home/keola:/bin/bash syslog:x:104:110::/home/syslog:/usr/sbin/nologin WHY: An empty second field in /etc/passwd means keola signs in with no password, whatever /etc/shadow holds. Run sudo pwconv, then sudo passwd keola. Lines from /etc/ssh/sshd_config. Tap the finding. Port 22 >> PermitRootLogin yes PasswordAuthentication yes X11Forwarding no WHY: PermitRootLogin yes lets attackers brute-force root directly. Set it to no and restart ssh. Lines found in /etc/sudoers.d/. Tap the finding. %sudo ALL=(ALL:ALL) ALL Defaults env_reset >> mallory ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL root ALL=(ALL:ALL) ALL WHY: Passwordless full sudo for an unlisted user is a root backdoor. Remove it with visudo -f. Output of sudo ss -tulpn. Brief: no FTP on this machine. Tap the finding. tcp LISTEN 0 128 0.0.0.0:22 users:(("sshd",pid=655)) >> tcp LISTEN 0 32 0.0.0.0:21 users:(("vsftpd",pid=812)) udp UNCONN 0 0 127.0.0.53:53 users:(("systemd-resolve",pid=400)) tcp LISTEN 0 128 127.0.0.1:631 users:(("cupsd",pid=701)) WHY: vsftpd on port 21 when the brief forbids FTP: disable it and remove the package. Output of sudo lsattr. Tap the finding. --------------e------- /etc/shadow >> ----i---------e------- /etc/passwd --------------e------- /etc/sudoers --------------e------- /etc/group WHY: The i flag makes /etc/passwd immutable, so user changes fail with a misleading error. Clear it with sudo chattr -i /etc/passwd. Lines from /etc/sysctl.conf. Tap the finding. net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies = 1 >> net.ipv4.ip_forward = 1 kernel.randomize_va_space = 2 fs.protected_symlinks = 1 WHY: ip_forward=1 makes a workstation route traffic, a pivot for attackers. Set it to 0 and apply with sysctl --system. ------------------------------ OFFICIAL SOURCES -------------------------------- Linux Mint documentation https://linuxmint.com/documentation.php Linux Mint 22.3 Cinnamon: new features https://www.linuxmint.com/rel_zena_cinnamon_whatsnew.php Ubuntu security https://ubuntu.com/security Ubuntu Server documentation: firewall (ufw) https://ubuntu.com/server/docs/how-to/security/firewalls/ pam_faillock manual (Ubuntu 24.04) https://manpages.ubuntu.com/manpages/noble/man8/pam_faillock.8.html sshd socket-based activation (Ubuntu) https://discourse.ubuntu.com/t/sshd-now-uses-socket-based-activation-ubuntu-22-10-and-later/30189 CIS Critical Security Controls v8.1 https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/v8 CIS Benchmarks https://www.cisecurity.org/cis-benchmarks ================================================================================